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This chapter maps little-studied interactions between public and private international law by 
comparing experiences in using private contracts to specify the meaning of international 
environmental treaty objectives that relate to equity (namely, fair and equitable benefit-sharing). In 
particular, the chapter contrasts two possible approaches in relying on private contracts: a bilateral 
approach – that is, reliance on ad hoc contracts under the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit-sharing (ABS) under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) – and a 
multilateral approach, namely reliance on standardised contractual clauses that have been developed 
intergovernmentally under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (International Treaty). In both cases, private contracts have played a key role in 
specifying the meaning of certain obligations that were left vague in the treaty text in relation to the 
objective of equity. 
  
The selected international environmental treaties serve to highlight more generally the significant 
private law dimension of public international law instruments on fair and equitable benefit-sharing,2 
which should be included in a debate on a broad notion of private international law.3 The delegation 
of regulatory powers foreseen in public international law in the pursuit of common interests to private 
parties negotiating private law instruments that are generally governed by self-interest4 has the 
potential result that different contracts may give different meanings to international obligations to the 
point of undermining a treaty objective, rather than upholding it. Such potential should be seen in the 
light of the ‘deeply ideological’ nature of a choice between private or public law instruments, which 
‘has shielded and perpetuated relationships of dominance in the past and present by the pretence that 
they belonged to the private realm.’5 The risks of contractualization of environmental governance 
have already been discussed (to some extent) in public international environmental law scholarship 
with a view to emphasizing the likely arising of a “limited and instrumentalist view of law”: such 
risks have been identified in the implicit bias towards market-based approaches and the protection of 
private interests on the basis of contractual freedom, private dispute resolution and confidentiality, to 
the disadvantage of other “constituencies” protected by the relevant international environmental 
                                                
1 Prof Morgera’s contribution to this chapter was provided under the framework of the project ‘BENELEX: Benefit-
sharing for an Equitable Transition to the Green Economy – The Role of Law’, funded by the European Research 
Council (November 2013–October 2018): www.benelex.ed.ac.uk. The authors are thankful to: the BENELEX team; 
BENELEX Advisors Duncan French, Colin Read and Claudio Chiarolla; BENELEX visiting scholar Dimitri Pag-yendu 
Yentchare; as well as to Shakeel Bhatti, Alex Mills and Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, for helpful comments and 
suggestions on previous drafts of the chapter.  
2 Another relevant instrument is World Health Organization (WHO), Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) 
Framework for the Sharing of Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, WHO Doc. WHA64.5, 24 
May 2011, which follows, to a great extent, the model of reliance on standardized contractual clauses of the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. 
3 See Mills’ chapter in this volume. 
4 A von Bogdandy, M Goldmann and I Venzke, ‘From Public International Law to International Public Law: 
Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority’ (2017) 28 European Journal of International 
Law 115, at 119 and 136-139. 
5 Ibid, at 124. 
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agreements but that are “left out of contractual negotiation, implementation and enforcement.”6 This 
is still a partially developed debate, however, that has not engaged with the private international law 
dimensions of this phenomenon. 
 
For this reason, the chapter also serves to focus on private international law more narrowly and 
traditionally construed, in relation to its role in ensuring access to justice in the context of the 
implementation of the selected international instruments. This is another key aspect of realising equity 
through private contracts. Private international law rules equip States with legislative competence to 
adjudicate disputes and enforce decisions between private parties in different countries.7 The extent 
of private international law’s ‘just distribution of regulatory authority,’8 however, depends on whether 
it operates as a fully-fledged ‘international system of rights protection.’9 On the one hand, the strategic 
use of private international law may impede access to justice, on the basis of political choices behind 
the technicalities of private international law.10 On the other hand, increasingly, private international 
law supports the recognition and enforcement of international human rights and fundamental rights  
frameworks.11 For example, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair and public hearing has been 
recognised and extended to parties in private disputes.12 Thus, the increasing13 role of the human right 
to have access to justice in the evolution of private international law needs to be considered from the 
perspective of public international environmental law, when its implementation relies on private 
contracts.  
 
Ultimately, comparing the opportunities, challenges and drawbacks arising from the interactions 
between public and private international law under the selected international environmental law 
treaties may help identify key questions that would benefit from a more systematic dialogue between 
public international lawyers and private international lawyers. These questions are both of a practical 
and principled nature. As to the former, questions are mainly due to unequal bargaining powers and 
the need to protect vulnerable parties to a contract, as well as the utility of bilateral and multilateral 
approaches to the resolution of disputes concerning contracts.14 As to the latter, the questions concern 
how the doctrine of comity in private international law enables States to reach non-State actors and 
provides contextual application of certain public international law obligations in furtherance of 
equitable objectives that go beyond the specific stakes and interests of parties to the contract. The 
modern construct of comity in private international law focuses on notions of ‘mutual trust,’15 and 
                                                
6 Eg N Affolder, ‘Square Pegs and Round Holes? Environmental Rights and the Private Sector’ in B Boer (ed), 
Environmental Law Dimensions of Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015) 12. 
7 L Gillies, ‘Creation of Subsidiary Jurisdiction Rules in the Recast of Brussels I: Back to the Drawing Board?’ (2012) 8 
Journal of Private International Law 489; A Mills, ‘Private International Law and EU External Relations: Think Local 
Act Global, or Think Global Act Local?’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 541, at 562.	
8 A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, Justice, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the 
International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010); H Muir-Watt 
and F Fernandez Arroyo (eds), Private International Law and Global Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2014). 
9 Mills (n 3); Gillies (n 7). 
10 See chapter by Hood in this collection. 
11 L Gillies, ‘Fundamental Rights and Judicial Cooperation in the Decisions of the Court of Justice on the Brussels I 
Regulation 2009-2014: The Story So Far’ in S Morano-Foadi and L Vickers (eds), Fundamental Rights in the EU: A 
Matter for Two Courts (Oxford, Hart, 2015); L Gillies and Mangan (eds), The Legal Challenges of Social Media 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2017). 	
12 Gillies (n 11) at 224-225 with regard to Article 47 of the Charter. 
13 See words of caution in this connection in Mills (n 3). 
14 C Chiarolla, “Biopiracy and the Role of Private International Law under the Nagoya Protocol,” IDDRI Working 
Paper No.2/February 2012, at 15, available at http://www2.ecolex.org/server2neu.php/libcat/restricted/li/MON-
086724.pdf.  
15 L Gillies (n 11); Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court), 18 December 2014, Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) 
TFEU; Gillies in Gillies and Mangan (n 11). 
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‘mutual recognition of State interests,’16 and operates as an ‘expansive’17 technique to support the 
relationship between international law and domestic legal orders, to the benefit of the efficient 
‘operation of systems of law.’18 Comity can operate in two principle ways. First, comity seeks 
equivalence through recognition of acts and judgments of foreign States. Second, it may operate to 
enforce contractual rights relating to jurisdiction or arbitration 19  agreements or, more frequently, to 
limit foreign court proceedings. 20  
 
Against this background, the chapter starts by assessing the relevance of private international law in 
the context of the Nagoya Protocol and identifies questions that deserve further research regarding 
the reliance on ad hoc contracts to realize the treaty objective of fair and equitable sharing of benefits. 
It then contrasts the reliance on standardized contractual clauses under the International Treaty, the 
role of private international law in that context and outstanding research questions. The chapter 
concludes with a broader reflection on the challenges arising from the intersection of public and 
private international law on the rationale, potential and pitfalls of the increasing reliance on private 
contracts in international environmental law. 
 
2. THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL AND AD HOC PRIVATE CONTRACTS  
 
The Nagoya Protocol is an international environmental treaty that regulates trans-boundary aspects 
of bio-based research and development, with a view to contributing to the conservation and 
sustainable use21 of biodiversity,22 as well as broader sustainable development issues (such as global 
health and poverty eradication).23 The Protocol includes international obligations between countries 
that provide access to, and countries that use, genetic resources and the traditional knowledge of 
indigenous peoples and local communities.24 The Protocol’s objective refers explicitly to fairness and 
equity in sharing benefits in two scenarios: among States – that is, between a State providing genetic 
resources – as well as within States, with indigenous peoples and local communities that provide their 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources or genetic resources that they hold.25 The 
Protocol, however, does not specify how equity should be ensured in either scenario, or whether 
efforts to that end should be monitored (either at the international or national level).26  
 
Nevertheless, the Protocol is expected ‘to reduce enormous global asymmetries’ among developed 
and developing States,27 by guiding the development of domestic legislation and the arising 
interaction of rights and duties for individuals/entities sharing benefits from different countries. The 
Protocol therefore aims at setting a multilateral framework coordinating domestic measures 
                                                
16 Gillies, in Gillies and Mangan (n 11). 
17 S Breyer, The Court and the World American Law and the New Global Realities (New York, Knopf, 2015) at 91-92. 
18 Ecobank v Transnational Inc v Tanoh [2015] EWCA Civ 1309, para 132. 
19 Cresendo Maritime Co, Alpha Bank A.E v Bank of Communications Company Limited, Nantong Mingde Heavy 
Industry Stock Co. Ltd., New Future International Trade Co. Ltd., Bank of Communcations Company Limited Qingdao 
Branch [2015] EWHC 3364 (Comm); Ecobank v Transnational Inc v Tanoh [2015] EWCA Civ 1309, English Court of 
Appeal para 85-91 and 99. 
20 D Holloway, ‘Case Comment England and Wales: Ecobank Transnational Inc v Tanoh’ (2016) International 
Arbitration Law Review N-16. 
21 Nagoya Protocol Article 1. 
22 The variability of life forms on earth: Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Art. 2. 
23 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (NP), preamble. 
24 E Morgera, E Tsioumani and M Buck, Unraveling the Nagoya Protocol: Commentary on the Protocol on Access and 
Benefit-sharing to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2014). 
25 NP Articles 1 and 5, and preamble. 
26 Morgera et al (n 24) at 48-52 and 375-377. 
27 B Dias, 'Preface', in E Morgera, M Buck and E Tsioumani (eds), 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-
Sharing in Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 
2013) 1. 
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governing contractual transactions,28 and fostering international cooperation, thereby operating 
‘across the public-private divide.’29 This should ultimately ensure the implementation of fair and 
equitable private-law contractual arrangements in each individual ABS transaction.30 These 
contractual arrangements (referred to in the Protocol as ‘mutually agreed terms’31 or MATs) are 
expected to set out conditions for access to genetic resources and traditional knowledge, and specific 
benefit-sharing obligations, in order to achieve the overarching equity objective of the Protocol in the 
context of specific ABS transactions.32 To add further complexity, the Nagoya Protocol’s open-ended 
provisions allow for a variety of legal approaches to implementation, through creative relations 
among international, national, and local law, including the customary laws of indigenous peoples and 
local communities.33  
 
MATs may be included in different types of contractual forms, and in effect an ABS deal may entail 
a plurality of contracts among different parties (individual researchers, private companies indigenous 
and local communities, public research institutions or government entity).34 As a result, the question 
of who has the authority to enter into an ABS contract can also be quite complicated, particularly 
when traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities is at stake and national law 
does not clarify the issue.35 For the purposes of the present paper, attention will focus on potentially 
weaker parties to MATs, who are likely to be developing-country research institutions and indigenous 
peoples’ representatives, who may have less exposure to transnational commercial practices and 
resources to tackle complex contractual negotiations. That said, because of the variety of contractual 
arrangements and of the type of parties to them, one should keep in mind that this is a generalization 
that may not apply in a number of cases in practice. 
A simple example is provided by the MATs on Teff (an annual grass with edible seeds)36 between 
the Ethiopian Institute of Biodiversity Conservation, which was authorized to conclude the contract 
on behalf of Ethiopia as the provider country, and a Dutch company in 2005. According to this 
contract, the company was permitted to access and use genetic resources specified in an annex for 
developing non-traditional food and beverage products listed in another annex. The MAT also 
included a a prohibition for the company to access, claim rights over, nor make commercial benefit 
out of, the traditional knowledge of Ethiopian communities on the conservation, cultivation and use 
of Teff without their explicit written agreement. The Institute retained the right to grant access to, and 
export, Teff genetic resources to other parties, as long as the buyers did not use it to make any of the 
listed products in the contract with the Dutch company. Finally, the MAT listed four different ways 
for the company to share monetary benefits, and five ways to share non-monetary benefits (such as 
sharing research results with the provider institution; involving Ethiopian scientists in research; 
preferring local institutions for breeding purposes and establishing businesses in Ethiopia together 
with Ethiopian counterparts).  
                                                
28 S Oberthür and K Rosendal, 'Conclusions' in S Oberthür and K Rosendal (eds), Global Governance of Genetic 
Resources: Access and Benefit Sharing After the Nagoya Protocol (London, Routledge, 2013), 231, at 237-239. 
29 Ibid. 
30  T Young, 'An International Cooperation Perspective' in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani (n 27), 451, at 457. 
31 NP Art 5(1-2 and 5). 
32 On the objective of the Nagoya Protocol, see Morgera et al (n 24) at 48-58 (where there is no reference to MAT). For 
a discussion on MAT, see Morgera et al (n 24) at 131-132, 167-169, 283-292 and 375-376. See also CBD Article 15(7), 
second sentence. 
33 Ibid., Art. 12(1). 
34 F Bellivier and C Noiville, Contrats et vivant : les droits de la circulation des ressources biologiques, (LGDJ, 2006), 
147- 149; B Tobin, ‘Biodiversity Prospecting Contracts: The Search for Equitable Agreements’ in Sarah Laird (ed), 
Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: Equitable Partnerships in Practice (London, Earthscan, 2002) 287; and T 
Young and M Tvedt,  Drafting Successful Access and Benefit-sharing Contracts (Leiden, Martinus Mijhoff, 2017). 
35 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
Nagoya Protocol: Intellectual Property Implications (Geneva, UN, 2014), at 156. 
36 R Andersen and T Winge, ‘The Access and Benefit Sharing Agreement on Teff Genetic Resources: Facts and 
Lessons’ (FNI Report 6/2012. Lysaker, FNI, 2012), at 60-63. 
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Given the central role of MATs in the implementation of the Protocol, the private law dimension of 
the Protocol is quite evident, as is the potential for different contracts to offer a diversity of meanings 
to international obligations concerning benefit-sharing. For one thing, the Protocol does not require 
countries explicitly to entrust or limit contractual freedom with respect to ensuring fairness and 
equity, contributing to environmental sustainability and respecting human rights.37 The Nagoya 
Protocol provisions concerning MAT are invariably of a procedural character,38 with some reference 
to substantive guarantees only transpiring in the Protocol provision on States supporting the 
development by indigenous peoples and local communities of minimum requirements securing 
fairness and equity for MAT negotiations39 and providing capacity-building.40 This may be 
considered a missed opportunity, as contractual practice concluded prior to the conclusion of the 
Nagoya Protocol already provided an indication of the challenges and drawbacks encountered in that 
regard.41  
 
As a mechanism in the ‘global ordering of private disputes,’42 private international law underscores 
the need to create the legislative preconditions at the domestic level. At this level, the operation of 
private international law in facilitating equitable sharing of benefits is prevalent in two, related 
respects. The first scenario arises from the inequality of bargaining power between providers (or their 
representatives) and users of genetic resources. Even where foreign parties could enjoy equal access 
to domestic courts in a certain jurisdiction, there is broad understanding that further measures are 
needed for those parties who wish to bring legal action before a court of a State other than that in 
which they are based.43 This may be particularly the case of providers of genetic resources or 
traditional knowledge that is party to a MAT, who can be presumed to lack the resources and 
knowledge of the relevant legal system to bring a case, probably of a long duration, in another 
country, where the R&D on their genetic resources is occurring, in order to obtain redress from a user 
that has allegedly breached MATs. As the next section will consider, parties to a MAT may specify 
which court has jurisdiction to interpret the MAT or hear a dispute relating to it. It could be argued 
that there should be an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the provider of the genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge as the weaker MAT party, with a choice of their local law, as a protective 
measure, in an analogous way to consumer protection under EU rules on jurisdiction and choice of 
law.44 It remains to be seen, as discussed below, whether MATs may be negotiated so as to privilege 
access to the courts of the provider. The second scenario is the use of contractual devices to limit 
claims for breach of the ABS contract, which consequently makes it difficult for weaker parties to 
MATs to access justice and enforce rights. Here, the particular objective is to address procedural 
challenges for individual providers and users situated in different countries45 arising from situations 
of breach of contractual obligations.46  
                                                
37 These are notably those of indigenous peoples and local communities: NP Arts. 5-7 and see Morgera et al (n 24), at 
117-130, 145-156 and 170-177. 
38 NP Articles 5, 6(3)(g), 15 and 18. 
39 NP Article 12(3)(b). 
40 NP Article 22. 
41 S Bhatti, S Carrizosa, P McGuire and T Young (eds), Contracting for ABS: The Legal and Scientific Implications of 
Bioprospecting Contracts (Gland, IUCN, 2009). 
42 H Muir Watt and F Fernández Arroyo (eds), Private International Law and Global Governance (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014); Gillies in Gillies and Mangan (n 8). 
43 H Isozaki, ‘Enforcement of ABS Agreements in User States’ in E Kamau and G Winter (eds), Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge, and the Law Solutions for Access and Benefit Sharing (London, Earthscan, 2009) 439, at 442. 
44 Regulation 1215/2012 Brussels I Bis, Articles 17-19; Regulation EC 593/2008 Rome I Regulation on Contractual 
Obligations, Article 6. 
45 L Glowka and V Normand, 'Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing,” in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani (n 27), 
at 36. 
46 The breach of MAT has been termed ‘misuse,’ in contrast to ‘misappropriation’ which generally refers to the 




2.1 The Interface between the Nagoya Protocol and Private International Law 
 
As MATs are concluded by parties in different jurisdiction, the Nagoya Protocol is notable among 
multilateral environmental agreements for providing an explicit link with private international law 
narrowly construed.47 It includes an article specifically devoted to three aspects of private 
international law: jurisdiction, applicable law, and mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments and arbitral awards.48 As will be discussed, private international law has an important role 
to play in providing a balance of parties’ interests and rights in agreeing MATs on the one hand, and 
in ensuring the principles of comity and respect for human rights are maintained at the point of 
enforcing MATs, on the other. 
 
  
2.2.1 Choice of jurisdiction 
 
With regard to the opportunity to seek recourse, the Nagoya Protocol aims to ensure opportunities to 
seek recourse in any party’s legal systems in case of cross-border dispute arising from MAT.49 This 
may be particularly complicated as domestic rules may vary on (and possibly prevent) standing for 
foreign government entities or for non-incorporated collective entities, such as indigenous peoples or 
local communities that are parties to MAT.50 The Protocol arguably aims to ensure that some 
remedies against breaches of MAT will be made available in all jurisdictions independently of the 
nationality of the claimant,51 taking into account de facto barriers such as costs and differing 
requirements about the entitlement to bring legal actions before foreign courts. 
 
In effect, the Protocol underlines the importance to identify the relevant providers and users to, or 
associated with, the MAT. Providers may prefer to bring an action for breach of MAT in the 
jurisdiction of the user, with a view to obtaining a judgment that can be directly enforced against the 
user in his/her own jurisdiction.52 From a private international law perspective, this may be effected 
in a number of ways. The first option is to establish jurisdiction on the basis of an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement in the MAT. In essence, the MAT should explicitly state which jurisdiction a 
dispute arising from MAT will be brought. 53 The second option is to sue a user where they are 
domiciled according to the procedural laws of the forum. The third option is to sue in the jurisdiction 
where the place of performance of the obligation in the MAT occurs or is to occur. 54  
 
Provided that the jurisdiction to which dispute resolution processes will be subjected is expressly 
stipulated in the MAT, the decision on which court will have competence will be made on the basis 
of domestic norms applicable in the given country, which are often influenced by an international or 
regional instrument on judicial cooperation.55 Two examples are instructive. First, the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005, currently in force between Mexico, Singapore and 
                                                
generally without PIC and MAT. See C Chiarolla, 'Role of Private International Law under the Nagoya Protocol'  in 
Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani (n 27), 423, at 427-428. 
47 NP Article 18; see Chiarolla (n 46); and also M Tvedt, ‘Beyond Nagoya: Towards a Legally Functional System of 
Access and Benefit-Sharing’ in Oberthür and Rosendal (n 28), 158, at 172. 
48 NP Article 18. 
49 NP Article 18(2); Glowka and Normand (n 45), at 36. 
50 C Godt, ‘Enforcement of Benefit-Sharing Duties in User Countries’ in Kamau and Winter (n 43), 419, at 422. 
51 T Greiber et al. An Explanatory Guide to the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing (Gland: IUCN, 2012), at 
186. 
52 Gurdial Singh Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on ABS: An Analysis (Kuala Lumpur: CEBLAW, 2011), at 12. 
53 NP Art 18; and Chiarolla (n 46), at 430. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Greiber et al (n 51), at 185. 
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EU Member States, provides a basis by which parties may select a court of a State “for the purposes 
of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal 
relationship.”56 This provides that the parties to a contact may specify which court has jurisdiction, 
the effect of which if valid renders such agreement exclusive and “independent of the other terms of 
the contract”.57 The role of jurisdiction agreements is important since the Nagoya Protocol itself does 
not provide guidance on how the courts should decide whether they have jurisdiction over MAT-
related disputes.58 Chiarolla suggested interpreting the expression, in the Nagoya Protocol, 
‘consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements’ of the party concerned as an 
acknowledgement or a safeguard clause that the availability of recourse to courts will depend on 
applicable rules on the choice of jurisdiction, as established in contracts and accepted by the named 
court, or in their absence by [the] private international law of the seized forum.’59 Accordingly, the 
Protocol places a duty on State Parties to provide parties to MAT opportunities to seek recourse in an 
agreed place. Arguably to ensure that when such recourse is provided, the seized forum ‘should assert 
jurisdiction unless the complaint is apparently based on dubious, speculative or vexatious grounds 
(eg, where none of the parties to the MAT have real connection with the forum).’60 This may reflect 
rules designed to protect the role of the chosen court in the situation where there is a lis pendens in 
breach of that agreement; that is, when a claimant brings prior proceedings in another court before 
the chosen court’s jurisdiction can be established. The 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention 
requires that a court which is not the parties’ chosen court must suspend or dismiss proceedings unless 
there is an issue with the agreement, its creation or its negative effect on the parties or the court 
seised.61  
 
Second, if the parties have not agreed the jurisdiction of any subsequent dispute, legal uncertainty 
may arise as to whether a national court in a given country where legal action has been brought will 
deem to have international jurisdictional competence to determine a dispute arising from MATs. The 
consequences may be that the rule of the user’s domicile would prevail as the general rule. If the 
parties have not selected an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in MAT, an alternative connecting factor 
is the domicile of the defendant. Domicile is generally determined according to the conflict of laws 
rules of the court seised. In the case of businesses, this is usually their principal place of business, 
central administration or statutory seat. In the case of individuals, their subjective intention and 
objective residence contribute to determining domicile. 
 
Alternatively, a special ground of international jurisdiction may apply. To establish an alternative 
basis of jurisdiction, it will be necessary to establish the characteristic function or purpose of the 
MAT. The Bonn Guidelines on ABS,62 an international soft-law instrument that was adopted before 
the Nagoya Protocol and continues to provide helpful guidance for its application,63 suggest that it is 
possible to characterise MATs as equivalent in broad purposes to an international commercial 
contract. It should be noted that seeing MATs, as well as other environmental contracts, as 
international commercial contracts has been considered problematic by public international 
environmental lawyers, as it provides an indication that limited efforts have been made to shape a 
contractual agreement around its specific subject-matter (a global environmental objective, rather 
than the object of a transnational sale). In other words, public international environmental lawyers 
                                                
56 Article 3(a), Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005. 
57 Eg Article 25 of EU Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels I Bis Regulation). 
58 Chiarolla (n 46), at 431. 
59 Ibid, 432. See also Greiber et al (n 51), at 186. 
60 Chiarolla (n 46), at 432. 
61 Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005, Article 6. At EU level, Article 31 of Brussels I Bis confirms that if an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement exists, ‘any other court must decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.’ 
62 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their 
Utilization, COP 6, Decision VI/24, paras 16(a)(ix) and 36(f), Appendix II. 
63 CBD Decision X/1 (2010), preambular para. 6, indicates that the Bonn Guidelines continue to be part of the 
‘international regime’ on ABS, after the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol.  
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have identified the risk of undermining the protection of the public value at stake and bypassing the 
opportunity to resolve specific legal issues that do not normally arise in the context of common 
commercial transactions.64 From a private international law perspective, however, seeing MATs as 
international commercial contracts may serve for the purposes of establishing international special 
jurisdiction. For example, in the European Union (EU) Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels I Bis 
Regulation), a matter relating to contract is one where an obligation is freely provided by one party 
towards the other. This Regulation enables special jurisdiction to be established in the courts of the 
Member State where the place of performance 65 of the contractual 66 obligation67 in question occurs. 
The place of performance as a basis for establishing the jurisdiction is where the characteristic 
contractual obligation (the obligation underpinning the contract) is to be performed.68  If an ABS deal 
is compared to a sale of goods, it could be argued that the provision of genetic resources is the 
characteristic obligation of MATs. If an ABS deal is compared to the provision of a service, it could 
be equally argued that providing access to genetic resources or traditional knowledge would make 
the provider the characteristic performer; or that sharing benefits would make the user the 
characteristic performer. If instead we consider an ABS transaction as a contract that aims to realize 
an international environmental treaty objective, then the user should be seen as the characteristic 
performer and sharing benefits arising from the use of genetic resource or traditional knowledge as 
the characteristic obligation of MATs.  
 
2.2.2 Choice of applicable law 
 
Whilst the Nagoya Protocol reinforces the need for parties to specify their chosen jurisdiction, it also 
underscores the importance to identify in MATs the substantive law to be applied to resolve any 
dispute.69 The question of applicable law is particularly complex. The domestic court may have to 
make a choice, on the basis of private international law norms and taking into consideration the 
interest of the parties, between two different sets of law, such as for instance its own domestic law or 
the law of another country, or it may decide that different questions in a given case may be governed 
by different countries’ law.70 The Hague Conference’s Principles on Choice of Law in International 
Commercial Contacts 2015, which are a soft-law instrument, may offer general guidance to parties 
to international commercial contracts. Where adopted, and in order to determine the applicable law 
of MATs, the Principles give guidance on the operation of an express or implied choice of law 
agreement.71 If proceedings are brought before the courts of an EU Member State, the Rome I 
Regulation provides that parties may choose the applicable law governing their contractual 
obligations.72 This choice may apply to the whole or part of a contract (depecage), subject to the 
choice being demonstrated with reasonable certainty.73 Such choice may be dis-applied if it does not 
appear “manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum”.74 The choice 
could refer to non-State law, such as the customary laws of the provider indigenous or local 
community’s habitual residence.75  
 
Absent an applicable law clause, legal uncertainty may arise as the determination of the law that will 
                                                
64 Affolder (n 6), at 25. 
65 Brussels I Bis, Article 7(1). C 12/76 Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v Dunlop AG [1976] ECR 1473; C-440/97 GIE 
Groupe Concorde v The Master of the Vessel “Suhadiwarno Panjan,” [1999] ECR I-6307. 
66 C 14/76 De Bloos Sprl v Bouyer SA [1976] ECR 1497. 
67 C-288/92 Custom Made Commercial Ltd Stawa Matallbau GmbH [1994] ECR I-2913. 
68 MATS ‘are closer and more similar to licenses and loan agreements, than to sales contracts’: UNCTAD (n 35) at 156. 
69 NP Article 18(1). 
70 Godt (n 50), at 423. 
71 Introduction, paragraph 1.12; however the Principles do not apply to the law determining the jurisdiction of a MAT 
(Article 1(3)(b)). 
72 EC Regulation 593/2008. 
73 Article 3(1). 
74 Article 21. The choice is subject to Article 9 (below). 
75 See for example Halpern v Halpern [2007] EWCA Civ 291. We are grateful to Alex Mills for the point. 
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govern the dispute, which would be left to the domestic court where legal action has been brought, 
on the basis of the domestic norms on private international law in its jurisdiction. For this reason, it 
is necessary to establish the characteristic performer of the MAT, since it is the law of that party’s 
habitual residence which will apply.76 As argued above, the characteristic performer is that party 
whose performance is regarded as fundamental to the purpose of the contract and from a public 
international law perspective, it could be the user of the genetic resources or traditional knowledge 
that is the characteristic performer of benefit-sharing.  
 
Whether the parties have specified a choice or not, the applicable law is subject to overriding 
mandatory rules, which are laws which “cannot be derogated from by agreement.”77 Overriding 
mandatory provisions of a country could be those regarded as crucial for safeguarding public 
interests.78 In the context of MATs, public interests may include the local or customary protections 
in place for providers such as indigenous communities and their representatives. The circumstances 
upon which this might apply are two-fold, but both are likely to have limited effect. The first is where 
the applicable law is subject to the overriding mandatory rules of the forum.79 The protection for the 
provider of the genetic resource or traditional knowledge is likely to differ between jurisdictions. The 
second is where the mandatory rules of the place of performance render performance unlawful.80 
However, this may point towards the mandatory rules of the user’s habitual residence, as the party 
undertaking the fundamental purpose of the contract. The utility of these provisions depends on the 
purpose of the relevant mandatory rule. In addition, it can also be argued that the public policy of the 
forum should be upheld if those earlier provisions are deemed manifestly incompatible with the 
forum’s public policy objectives.81 The potential consequences of a jurisdiction agreement are 
therefore significant for providers also in terms of applicable law, and should be noted if the 
jurisdiction specified is not that of the provider to the MAT. 
 
2.2.3 Access to justice and Recognition of foreign judgments 
 
With regard to access to justice and recognition of foreign judgments, the Nagoya Protocol requires 
the development of domestic measures on access to justice and utilisation of mechanisms of mutual 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards,82 with a view to supporting 
providers that usually do not have easy access to courts in third countries. It has been noted that this 
requires unilateral development of domestic measures, rather than the multilateral development of 
harmonised requirements.83 It may also serve to underline that both Parties that see themselves as 
mostly users’ countries or providers’ countries have to develop such domestic measures. The Nagoya 
Protocol further obliges Parties to take effective measures, as appropriate, regarding access to 
justice.84 It has thus been argued that human rights standards may be used as a yardstick to ensure 
that access to justice has been provided in a specific case under the Protocol. 85 State Parties also have 
an obligation to adopt effective measures addressing the utilization of mechanisms for the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral decisions.86 In other words, they are to support 
participation in existing mechanisms or establish new ones if they do not exist.87 Recognition of 
                                                
76 The Rome I Regulation, for instance, contains rules which determine the applicable law in the absence of choice: 
Article 4(2). 
77 Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (15th ed, Sweet and Maxwell, 2017) at 32R-082. 
78 Eg overarching objective of Article 9(1) of Rome I Regulation. 
79 Article 9(2). 
80 Article 9(3). 
81 As Articles 9(1) and (3) may require to be considered in the light of Article 21. 
82 NP Article 18(3). Glowka and Normand, (n 45), at 36. 
83 Greiber et al (n 51), at 187. 
84 NP Article 18(3)(a). 
85 A Savaresi, 'The International Human Rights Law Implications of the Nagoya Protocol' in Morgera, Buck and 
Tsioumani (n 27), 72. 
86 NP Article 18(3)(b). 
87 Chiarolla (n 46), at, 445. 
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foreign judgments remains a complex matter.88 Where the parties have agreed a choice of jurisdiction, 
the 2005 Choice of Court Convention establishes an obligation to recognize or enforce a judgment 
from such a court.89 There are protections, however, where recognition may be refused such as the 
right to a fair trial, where ‘the judgment is incompatible with fundamental principles of procedural 
fairness.’90 By contrast, the recognition of foreign arbitral awards may be considered ‘generally 
easier’ as a high number of countries are Parties to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.91 There is also the possibility for Parties to conclude 
an ex post arbitration arrangement.92  
 
In sum, as a key principle of dispute resolution concerning MATs, the Nagoya Protocol facilitates to 
a degree the autonomy of parties to MAT in selecting the jurisdiction and applicable law. State Parties 
to the Protocol, however, continue to have two important contributions. The first is through the 
application of private international law in the absence of choice by MAT parties. The second is to 
protect the provider of genetic resources or traditional knowledge, who is usually the weaker party to 
the MAT, from standard choice of law clauses, by subjecting the latter to overriding mandatory 
provisions or the operation of the public policy exception. 
 
 
2.2.4 Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
The Nagoya Protocol highlights the possibility for parties to MAT to agree up-front to settle disputes 
through alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms rather than domestic courts.93 This may be 
useful when such non-judicial means entail higher flexibility, simpler procedures and lower costs 
than judicial mechanism.94 The provision explicitly mentions mediation or arbitration, but does not 
exclude that parties to MAT may also agree to have recourse to other mechanisms, including 
community-based dispute resolution systems or an international institution that may facilitate the 
resolution of the dispute. State parties’ obligation to encourage parties establishing MAT to include 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms as options should be interpreted and implemented taking 
in due consideration indigenous peoples and local communities’ customary laws and procedures, 
when these communities are concerned by the ABS transaction.95 There may be an advantage in 
applying non-State law through such mechanisms. The Protocol, however, glosses over the 
complexity of utilising alternative dispute resolution mechanisms generally used in commercial law 
disputes for the purposes of achieving fair and equitable benefit-sharing, although it cannot be 
excluded that guidance on this aspect could be developed by the Protocol’s governing body at a later 
stage.96  
 
The Nagoya Protocol does not specify which measures must be taken by State Parties, but qualifies 
the obligation by reference to ‘as appropriate,’ thereby leaving flexibility to State Parties in its 
implementation. Parties can thus choose among various ways to facilitate access to courts or the 
‘option’97 for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for foreign users or providers. Insofar as 
indigenous peoples and local communities are parties to MAT, consideration must be given to their 
                                                
88 CBD Working Group on ABS, “Report of the expert meeting on compliance,” UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/3. For a 
discussion based on the case of Japan, see Isozaki, (n 43), at 443-444. 
89 Article 8. 
90 Article 9(e). The grounds are broadly similar to those in Articles 36, 37 and 29 of EU 1215/2012. 
91 Chiarolla, (n 47), at 444.  
92 Ibid. 
93 NP Article 18(1). See for instance Article 8 of the ITPGRFA SMTA which provides for the following steps on dispute 
resolution: amicable dispute settlement, mediation and arbitration. 
94 Isozaki (n 43),  at 446. 
95 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1): see Morgera et al (n 24) at 217-222. 
96 Young (n 30), 451, at 488. See Morgera et al (n 24) at 335-336. 
97 Article 18(1)(c). 
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customary laws and procedures,98 in accordance with relevant international human rights norms and 
standards.99 In that regard, it has been recommended that States ensure the best means to attain access 
to justice in line with indigenous peoples’ self-determination and related rights to participate in 
decision-making affecting them.100 States are also expected to work with indigenous peoples and 
local communities to address the underlying issues that prevent them from having access to justice 
on an equal basis with others, and facilitate their access to legal remedies including by supporting 
their capacity development in making use of legal systems.101  
 
In private international law terms, ADR measures have been given recognition by courts and 
increasingly referred to in recent international private law instruments.102 A range of concerns, 
however, surround the recourse to ADR. From a public international law perspective, ADR 
(particularly arbitration) may well be more costly and less transparent than access to national 
courses,103 as arbitral awards are usually confidential. In addition, arbitrators are likely to be more 
familiar with (and therefore more inclined to give weight to) commercial law than international 
environmental law dimensions of the dispute. From a private international law perspective, a 
principled objection can also be identified: as discussed elsewhere in this volume,104 arbitration 
essentially ‘takes away from States altogether” their regulatory authority over the private law 
questions at hand, and with that – we add – also the regulatory authority over the underlying public 
international law objectives. There is therefore a risk in diverting disputes from courts, as public 
bodies may be better entrusted to pursue public objectives. The risk consists in exposing parties to 
power imbalances in the resolution of the dispute, and the lack for similar standards of justice than 
those presumed to be inherent in courts.105 This flexible approach should be thus subject to three 
related conditions, which have already been identified in the previous discussion about the role of 
private international law under the Nagoya Protocol. First, recourse to ADR should not restrict access 
to a court and an appropriate remedy in line with international human rights law. Second, it should 
ensure private international law support the principle of comity, by treating foreign laws in an 
equivalent manner and providing for the mutual enforcement of foreign judgments. Third, the option 
in the Protocol for alternative dispute resolution should support the provider of genetic resources or 
traditional knowledge, if that is the weaker party to the MAT. These considerations call for further 
discussion at inter-governmental level on the role of protective jurisdiction and choice of law rules, 
as well as ADR, in resolving disputes arising from MATs. 
 
 
2.3 Preliminary observations 
 
In sum, as a key principle of dispute resolution concerning MATs, the Nagoya Protocol facilitates 
party autonomy in selecting the jurisdiction and applicable law. It remains doubtful, however, 
whether it is feasible to achieve the fairness and equity objectives of the Nagoya Protocol through 
                                                
98 Nagoya Protocol Article 12(1). See Morgera et al (n 24) at 217. 
99 See Morgera et al (n 24) at 31-42. 
100 Human Rights Council, “Expert Mechanism Advice No 5 Access to justice in the promotion and protection of the 
rights of indigenous peoples,” (2013), accessed 30 November 2013, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IPeoples/EMRIP/Session6/A-HRC-EMRIP-2013-2_en.pdf>, Annex, 
paragraph 4. 
101 Ibid, paragraphs 8 and 10. 
102 For example, the English High Court in Cable and Wireless Plc v IBM United Kingdom Ltd [2002] All ER (Comm) 
1041; Recital 12 Regulation EC1215/2012, Hague Conference’s Principles on Choice of Law in International 
Commercial Contacts 2015 at para 1.20. 
103 While to date there has been nearly no national litigation on MAT, see: T ten Kate, L Touche and A Collis, “Benefit-
sharing Case Study: Yellowstone National Park and the Diversa Corporation – Submission to the Executive Secretary 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity” (22 April 1998) at 17-18. 
104 Mills (n 3). 
105 L McGregor, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution and Human Rights: Developing a Rights-Based Approach through the 
ECHR’ (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law 607, at 609. 
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contractual negotiations in the context of documented disparities in bargaining power among likely 
parties. From a public law perspective, one potential avenue to assessing this may be the multilateral 
Compliance Committee created under the Protocol.106 This non-adversarial Committee could assess 
the extent to which States exercise control over contractual negotiations and the degree of inter-State 
cooperation in ensuring access to justice and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, 
with a view to provide advice to Nagoya Protocol Parties. From a private law perspective, State 
Parties to the Protocol continue to have two important contributions. The first is to determine the 
application and effectiveness of private international laws to determine jurisdiction and applicable 
law in the absence of party choice. The second is to protect providers of genetic resources or 
traditional knowledge, who is usually the weaker party to a MAT, from standard choice of law 
clauses. By subjecting the latter to overriding mandatory provisions or the operation of the public 
policy exception, preference is given to the laws and courts of the providers of genetic resources or 
traditional knowledge. However, this is subject to the overriding mandatory provision of the forum.  
 
The preceding analysis from a private law perspective has also identified a series of questions that 
have not yet received sufficient attention under the Nagoya Protocol: the role of human rights 
standards of access to justice in connection with the option of ADR and the characterisation of MATs 
as international commercial contracts, which has implications for establishing an international special 
jurisdiction. The Nagoya Protocol Compliance Committee could therefore potentially provide 
clarifications both on the broadly conceived private dimensions of the Nagoya Protocol, as well as 
on these technical questions arising from a narrow understanding of private international law, that 
also have a bearing on realising the equity objective of the treaty.  
 
 
3 STANDARDIZED CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL 
TREATY 
 
The International Treaty has as its objective the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, as well as the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from 
their use, in harmony with the CBD, for sustainable agriculture and food security. Under the 
ITPGRFA, a multilateral system of access and benefit-sharing facilitates access to, and exchange of, 
a specified list of crops107 that are under the management and control of State Parties and in the public 
domain, as well as those held by a network of collections ‘in trust for the benefit of the international 
community.’108 The specified crops are then held in a common pool of plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture that had been identified on the basis of criteria of food security and 
interdependence,109 called the Multilateral System. The crops in the Multilateral System are then 
exchanged according to the terms of the standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA), which is a 
standardised contract that was intergovernmentally negotiated and adopted by the Treaty’s Governing 
Body.110  
Under the International Treaty, therefore, recourse is had to standard contractual clauses for the 
realisation of the treaty objective of fair and equitable benefit-sharing. This could in principle ensure 
that private contracts are drafted in a way that clearly contributes to the treaty objective. As opposed 
to ad hoc private contractual negotiations under the Nagoya Protocol, the Treaty’s multilateral 
                                                
106 NP Art. 20; and Decision NPI-1. 
107 ITPGRFA Annex I. This section draws on E Tsioumani, "Exploring Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing from the Lab 
to the Land (Part I): Agricultural Research and Development in the Context of Conservation and the Sustainable Use of 
Agricultural Biodiversity" (SSRN 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524337. 
108 Agreement with FAO to Place the International Agricultural Research Centres of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research In-Trust Collections of Plant Genetic Resources under the Auspices of FAO (1994); 
and CGIAR Principles on the Management of Intellectual Assets (2012), articles 5-4: Tsioumani, ‘Beyond Access and 
Benefit-sharing: Lessons from the Law and Governance of Agricultural Biodiversity’ (SSRN, 2016). 
109 ITPGRFA Article 11(1) and preamble.  
110 ITPGRFA Governing Body Resolution 2/2006 (2006).  
	 14	
benefit-sharing system provides a more direct line of accountability to achieve equity as it is 
intergovernmentally adopted. In other words, States, who are bound to achieve treaty objectives, are 
responsible for devising contractual clauses such as to ensure that a private law instrument can 
achieve a public international law objective. To the authors’ knowledge, however, no study has been 
undertaken to assess whether and to what extent multilaterally standardised contractual clauses 
effectively serve to achieve equity, or to determine the relative advantages and shortcomings of 
bilateral and multilateral benefit-sharing approaches vis-à-vis realising equity.  
 
 
3.1 The interface between the International Treaty and private international law 
 
The private law dimension of the International Treaty lies in its reliance on standard contractual 
clauses in the SMTA that provide a choice between two mandatory monetary benefit-sharing options: 
a default scheme, according to which the recipient will pay 1.1 percent of gross sales to the Treaty’s 
benefit-sharing fund in case of commercialization of new products incorporating material accessed 
from the Multilateral System and if its availability to others is restricted; and an alternative formula 
whereby recipients pay 0.5 percent of gross sales on all products of the species they accessed from 
the Multilateral System, regardless of whether the products incorporate the material accessed and 
regardless of whether or not the new products are available without restriction.111 Those that make 
their products available for further research and breeding without restriction, however, are exempted 
from mandatory payments. Notwithstanding the limited transaction costs associated with a standard 
contractual approach as opposed to the ad hoc one under the Nagoya Protocol, the SMTA is only 
used to a limited extent and no monetary benefits have been accrued yet.112 A process is underway 
under the International Treaty to develop an upfront subscription system (as fees for access to 
materials in the Multilateral System)113 that may replace or complement the current payment 
obligations after commercialisation. The proposed system is expected to further reduce transaction 
costs (as it would save the costs of tracking genetic resources up to the point of their 
commercialisation), and increase legal certainty.114 These negotiations are therefore expected to lead 
to an amendment of the standard contractual clauses.115  
 
Regardless of its current or likely future form, the standardised contractual approach of the 
International Treaty may be capable to manage the risk, identified at the start of this chapter, arising 
from the delegation of responsibility to realize a treaty objective to private parties to a private contract. 
First, this is done through an express choice of law clause in the SMTA, which refers to ‘General 
Principles of Law, including the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004, 
the objectives and the relevant provisions of the Treaty and, where necessary for interpretation, the 
decisions of the Governing Body’ (emphasis added).116 This shows that a standardised contract allows 
to make a clearer, explicit connection with the public international law dimension of an ABS 
transaction, by making reference to the treaty objectives and provisions as terms of reference for the 
interpretation of the contract.117  
 
                                                
111 See the ITPGRFA Standard Material Transfer Agreement, articles 6(7) and 6(11).   
112 Tsioumani (n 108). 
113 IT/GB-6/15/6 Add.1 and Rev.1 (2015). 
114 S Gagnon et al., "Summary of the Sixth Session of the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture" (2015) 9:565 Earth Negotiations Bulletin. 
115 That is expected in 2019: see Governing Body resolution (2017). 
116 Art 7 SMTA 
117 C Chiarolla, ‘Plant Patenting, Benefit Sharing and the Law Applicable to the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
Standard Material Transfer Agreement’ (2008) 11 Journal of World Intellectual Property 1, observes ‘The reference to 
“the objectives and the relevant provisions of the Treaty” (i.e. truly international standards) reflects the important public 
interest functions discharged by the SMTA.’ 
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If a dispute has been referred to arbitration, the arbitral tribunal would apply the UNIDROIT 
Principles. The 2004 Principles state that the applicable law is still to be determined by reference to 
the private international law rules of the forum.118 The clause, therefore, does not necessarily exclude 
the applicability of national law, as discussed by Chiarolla. National laws may have a supplementary 
role in addressing issues that are critical for the implementation of the SMTA, including ‘the validity 
of the method of expressing acceptance of the SMTA to the enforceability of third party beneficiary's 
rights, from the scope of intellectual property right protection, which can be claimed by recipients 
over a derivative product, to the enforcement of their benefit-sharing obligations.’119 Questions of 
applicable law are quintessentially a technical matter of private international law and the resulting 
balance between non-national, international and national standards in the context of the SMTA may 
end up having a significant influence on the realisation of equity in this context.120 In other words, 
notwithstanding the careful management of the risks arising from the reliance on private contracts 
through a standardised approach, State Parties continue to play a significant role in the realisation of 
the treaty objective.  
 
Second, to ‘ensure that the SMTA is interpreted and applied in a uniform manner across different 
jurisdictions, the recourse to national courts should be almost entirely excluded for any dispute 
concerning the SMTA.’121 In effect, under the International Treaty, the observance of the contractual 
terms and conditions of the SMTA by individual providers and recipients is guaranteed by the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) acting as the ‘Third Party Beneficiary,’ in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of the SMTA. FAO is the entity designated by the Treaty Governing Body 
to act on its behalf to request information to SMTA parties, initiate dispute settlement procedures 
regarding rights and obligations of SMTA parties, and in the context of dispute settlement, the right 
to request that the appropriate information, including samples as necessary, be made available by 
SMTA parties, regarding their obligations. FAO may receive and use information on cases of non-
compliance from SMTA parties or any other person. Where FAO has received such information, it 
may request additional information from SMTA parties. If the information so gathered leads FAO to 
believe that a possible case of non-compliance might have occurred, FAO may trigger amicable 
negotiations through an initial notice to the parties to the SMTA. If the dispute cannot be resolved by 
negotiation, FAO shall commence or encourage SMTA parties to commence mediation 
proceedings.122 If the dispute has not been resolved by mediation within six months of the 
commencement of the mediation or if it otherwise appears that the dispute cannot be resolved within 
twelve months after the issuance of initial notice, FAO may submit the dispute to binding 
arbitration.123 As explained by Chiarolla, SMTA parties are free to choose the arbitrators and the lex 
arbitri; but if they do not do so, ‘the dispute shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of 
the International Chamber of Commerce, by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the 
said Rules.’124 Because of the reliance of the Treaty SMTA on alternative dispute resolution, the point 
made above is valid also in the Treaty context: ADR should not prejudice the right to have recourse 
to standard dispute resolution, in order to ensure access to a court and a remedy in light of 
international human rights standards. This point is supported by the updated UNIDROIT Principles 
2010.125 There may, thus, be a tension between ensuring the treaty objective of equity through 
mandatory ADR under the Treaty and the need to balance also international human rights law 
considerations related to access to justice and a remedy, if the ADR provided for under the Treaty do 
                                                
118 UNIDROIT Principle of International Commercial Contracts 2004, Preamble 4(a), at p.3. 




123 http://www.planttreaty.org/content/what-third-party-beneficiary; SMTA article 8.4(c). The WHO PIP Framework 
includes in its Standard Material Transfer Agreements with private companies the same provision on settlement on 
disputes than the International Treaty. 
124 Chiarolla (n 117). 
125 UNIDROIT Principle of International Commercial Contracts 2010, Preamble 4(a). 
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not provide similar standards than those presumed to be inherent in courts.126 In addition, private 
international law continues to play a role in this connection: State Parties must ensure comity – the 
equivalence of acts and judgments, and the enforcement of arbitral awards.  
 
 
3.2 Comparative Observations 
 
Compared to the Nagoya Protocol and its bilateral benefit-sharing approach relying on ad hoc 
contractual arrangements, the International Treaty and its multilateral benefit-sharing approach 
relying on standardized contractual approaches offer specific opportunities, both in terms of 
applicable law and access to justice, to ensure a coherent interpretation of the equity objective of the 
treaty. As States, who are bound to achieve treaty objectives, are to devise and agree upon contractual 
clauses, they play a direct role in ensuring that a private law instrument can achieve a public 
international law objective. As a result, the SMTA specifically calls for interpreting contractual 
clauses in light of the treaty objective. In addition, it excludes disputes in national courts in different 
jurisdiction, thereby maximising the chances of applying the contractual clauses in a uniform manner 
thanks also to the role of FAO as the third party beneficiary acting in the interests of the providers. 
Even in this context, however, the operation of private international law is not excluded and the 
considerations made from that perspective in the analysis of the Nagoya Protocol have some bearing, 
notably the continued equivalence of acts and judgments and enforcement of judgments via a 
multilateral agreement or through comity. 127 In addition, the applicable law is still to be determined 
by reference to the private international law rules of the forum,128 and recourse to ADR cannot 
exclude access to standard dispute resolution if so required by relevant international human rights 
standards related to access to justice.  
 
These considerations are not only relevant by way of contrast with the ad hoc contractual approach 
of the Nagoya Protocol. They may also be relevant de lege ferenda, if the Parties to the Nagoya 
Protocol decide to internationally endorse model contractual clauses,129 whether generally or as a 
‘predetermination of enforceability’ that would enable Parties to ensure their automatic recognition 
in domestic courts.130 This development could lead to a re-universalising experience of what was 
delegated to the contractual level to realise international treaty objectives.131 Specifically, the Nagoya 
Protocol creates a best-endeavor obligation for all Parties to support the development, update and use 
of model contractual clauses for MAT.132 This obligation can be undertaken unilaterally by State 
Parties establishing ‘default’ or ‘standard’ MAT for specific categories of genetic resources under 
their jurisdiction or for specific cases.133 Such default MAT would likely have to be accepted by a 
user upon applying for access to genetic resources and/or traditional knowledge, or could apply 
automatically unless different MAT are negotiated. 134 Parties could also implement this obligation 
collectively in the context of bilateral or regional ABS frameworks,135 and at the multilateral level. 
This should be read in conjunction with the obligation for Parties to endeavour to support, as 
appropriate, the development by indigenous and local communities of model contractual clauses for 
                                                
126 McGregor (n 105), at 609. 
127 Chiarolla (n 14). 
128 UNIDROIT Principle of International Commercial Contracts, Preamble 4(a), at 3. 
129 NP Art. 19(2). 
130 Young, (n 30), 493. Such endorsement could be undertaken on the basis of Nagoya Protocol Article 26(4)(f). 
131 The authors are grateful to Alex Mills for this comment during the first workshop organized in connection with this 
book project. 
132 NP Article 19(1). 
133 Morgera et al (n 24), at 144. 
134 See for instance the standard conditions that apply to bioprospecting activities with non-commercial purpose on 
Commonwealth territories in Australia: “Permits for Non-Commercial Purposes,” Government of Australia, accessed 30 
November 2013, <www.environment.gov.au/node/14465>. 
135 See Morgera et al (n 24), at 93. 
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benefit-sharing arising from the utilisation of traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources.136 On this basis, the Protocol’s governing body is to periodically ‘take stock’ of the use of 
standardised contractual clauses.137 seeking to tap into normative activities undertaken by various 
ABS stakeholders such as the research community, the private sector, indigenous peoples and local 
communities, and NGOs at the national (but also sub-national and transnational) levels as a bottom-
up source of inspiration for multilateral discussions on ways to facilitate implementation of and 
compliance with the Protocol.138 In doing so, State Parties to the Nagoya Protocol would be well 
advised to take into account the private international law-related challenges arising from a 




4 OVERALL REFLECTION 
 
There is a significant, and growing, trend in international environmental law of relying on private 
contracts for the contextual realisation of treaty objectives related to equity. This is particularly the 
case in relation to access to genetic resources for research and development, but it is also true in the 
specific area of deep seabed mining.139 That said, the type of decision-making (consensus or other) 
and the representation of different States in the decision-making body tasked with the development 
of standard contractual clauses varies from one framework to another. In addition, the degree to which 
these clauses are open, if at all, to negotiations varies from one framework to another.140 Different 
examples can also be found and include, for instance, the use of private international contracts in the 
area of climate change,141  as part of a project-based mechanism to assist developed countries to 
achieve their emission reduction commitments and contribute to sustainable development.142 
 
Experiences under international treaties that set out multilateral benefit-sharing systems seem to 
indicate that the international community can draw multilaterally a private contract that may limit 
risks in coherently pursuing a treaty objective related to equity. Whether the contracts are left to 
bilateral negotiations or to intergovernmental multilateral standardisation, however, the sheer 
technical complexity of the subject-matter makes it difficult to predict which contractual clauses can 
in practice contribute to achieve such a treaty objective.143 In informal sectors (open-access seeds) 
where experimentation has been made on using contracts for proactively contribute to global goals, 
huge difficulties have been encountered in making contracts justiciable. Fear of potential intellectual 
property litigation (due to uncertain outcome, costs and protracted procedures) generally inhibits 
small-scale users from enforcing contractual obligations of a proactive nature.144 Thus, even when 
standardised, contractual arrangements in practice disadvantage private parties with less means and 
knowledge. The need to couple reliance on standard contractual clauses with the provision of 
appropriate capacity building and other support from States in a treaty can thus be quite significant. 
In addition, reliance on private contracts and alternative dispute resolution techniques for the 
                                                
136 NP Article 12(3)(c). See Morgera et al (n 24), at 216. 
137 NP Article 19(2). 
138 E Morgera, M Buck and E Tsioumani, ‘Introduction’ in Morgera, Buck and Tsioumani (n 27), at 10. 
139 A separate discussion, however, is warranted for the contracts used by the International Seabed Authority under the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, given the role of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in that 
connection. 
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142 Under the Kyoto Protocol Article 12: Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). A successor to this Mechanism is 
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143 We are grateful to Elsa Tsioumani for this observation. 
144 E Tsioumani, M Muzurakis, Y Ieropoulos and A Tsioumanis, ‘Following the Open Source Trail Outside the Digital 
World: Open Source Applications in Agricultural Research and Development’ (2016) 14 tripleC 145.  
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realization of international treaty objectives also raise challenges in balancing confidentiality and the 
necessary degree of transparency linked to the pursuance of a global objective.145  
 
Not enough literature has engaged with the rationale underlying this trend, its potential and pitfalls 
for the functioning and legitimacy of international cooperation. This chapter has identified several 
questions that require further consideration, through a dialogue among public and private 
international lawyers. Granted, such a dialogue would require, first of all, building a certain level of 
familiarity with (or interest in) highly technical international regimes such as those on ABS that may 
be difficult to achieve, particularly in those countries where legal capacity is a scarce resource to start 
with. Equally, such a dialogue requires that public international lawyers engage with very detailed 
and complex questions of private international law that are quite unfamiliar to them, to get to critical 
underlying policy choices. Nevertheless, such a dialogue is needed, as it is on the minute and complex 
details of these bodies of law that opportunities for realizing equitable outcomes depend in practice.  
 
From a public international law perspective, the first question is whether and under which conditions 
private law contracts are appropriate instruments to realise international treaty objectives and whether 
they may lead to undue divergence in the interpretation and application of international treaty 
provisions. Under the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-sharing, a 
bilateral approach to the matter (i.e. leaving discretion to individual parties as to whether and to what 
extent regulate private contractual negotiations) certainly has the greatest potential for misuse and 
divergent approaches, in consideration of the documented power imbalances among likely parties. 
Under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, where a 
multilateral approach to benefit-sharing has been adopted, intergovernmentally adopted standard 
clauses may support coherence in interpretation but they may also prevent bottom-up practices that 
may be better suited to a particular reality of context. This is an opportunity, instead, that the Nagoya 
Protocol could seize with regular stocktaking exercises of practices on the ground. Connected to this 
discussion, another point that has not received sufficient thought is the potential role of multilateral 
compliance committees to ascertain opportunities and risks for different contracts to offer a diversity 
of meanings of international obligations. 
 
From a private international law perspective, more discussion is necessary to understand the role of 
the doctrine of comity as a bridge between self-interest and common objectives in ensuring 
equivalence, recognition of party autonomy and the application of mandatory rules protecting the 
weaker party to a contract. This is necessary to ensure that States’ reliance on private contacts to 
implement international environmental obligations does not shield them from the responsibility to 
create the necessary legislative preconditions at the domestic level, including through private 
international law, for the realization of the underlying public international law objectives. 
Specifically, private international law questions related to access to justice should be further 
discussed, including when recourse is made to alternative dispute resolution, in light of international 
human rights standards on access to an appropriate remedy. These considerations also have a bearing 
on the determination of the characteristic performance of ABS contracts, with a view to realizing the 
equity objective pursed by relevant public international law, rather than by reference to prevalent 




                                                
145 These questions have arisen in the specific context of the International Seabed Authority, but could be relevant in 
other treaty settings. See ITLOS, 2011 Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea on “Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to 
Activities in the Area”, paras 225. We are grateful to Duncan French for drawing our attention to these points at the first 
workshop. 
